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THE MORTGAGEE'S RIGHT TO RENTS AFTER DEFAULT
DESPITE his favored position in the hierarchy of creditors, the mortgagee
has not been spared the perplexities which have attended debt collection
during the past decade. Foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property in
an atmosphere of declining land values has frequently yielded less than the
secured debt. Bankruptcy has provided a refuge for many defaulting mort-
gagors, while others have resorted to "milking" 1 the pledged asset in order
to buy off threatening creditors. Rents often represent the only liquid asset
which a mortgagee can reach to supplement or to avoid levying immediately
upon the shrinking value that the pledged security still retains. The right
to rents uniformly has been held to follow possession of the mortgaged
1. "Milking" has become a standard term denoting spoliation of the mortgaged
property, rent reductions and lease cancellations granted by the mortgagor for a cash
consideration, and prepayments of rent-all devices by which the hard-pressed mortgagor
saps the value from the pledged assets.
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHT TO RENTS1
premises. But since courts have become increasingly reluctant to recognize
any inherent right to possession in the mortgagee, devices such as rent
pledges, rent assignments, and receivership clauses have been drafted into
mortgage instruments. Mlost jurisdictions, however, have hesitated to give
effect to these protective devices. The rights of the mortgagee vary widely
from state to state, - and decisions conflict even within a single jurisdiction.
Though the distinction between so-called "title" 3 and "lien"' states does not
seem to control, vestiges of this historical dichotomy still appear in the theories
upon which the mortgagee's right to collect rent is predicated.' It is proposed
to consider here the various devices available to the mortgagee for applying
rents to his debt and their relative efficacy in realizing upon the pledged asset.
RENT CLAUSES
The great majority of states today follow the lien theory,0 and even those
still dinging to the title doctrine have modified by statute the mortgagee's
right to possession.7 Consequently, mortgagees who have failed to secure
2. Not only have courts reached conflicting conclusions from the same set of oper-
ative facts, but identical conclusions have been based upon completely different theories.
See discussion in Berick, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents (1934) 8 U. oF CiN. L Rzv.
250.
3. At common law, the mortgage conveyed to the mortgagee a legal title defeasible
upon complete fulfillment of the secured obligation. The mortgagee after default -as en-
titled to enter into possession peaceably or evict the mortgagor by ejectment in order to
satisfy his debt. Since rents were held to follow possession, the mortgagee of leased prem-
ises was enabled, without any stipulation as to rentals, to seize the property conveyed and
apply accruing rents to his debt. See Berick, The Iortgagee's Right to Rents (1934)
8 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 250.
4. Courts of equity developed the "lien" theory under which title remains in the
mortgagor, and the mortgage is a mere security for the debt, conveying to the mortgagee
only the "right to a lien." In the absence of stipulation to the contrary, the right to
rents remain in the mortgagor until after a valid foreclosure sale and actual delivery of
the referee's deed. See 2 WILTSIE, 'MORTGAGE FORFcOSU'RE (5th ed. 1939) § 560.
5. This terminology retains little validity today in explaining the varying effects
which courts have given the mortgagee's claim to rents. See Sturges and Clark, Legal
Theory and Real Property Mortgages (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 691.
6. As examples of vigorous recent pronouncements of title doctrines, see Peoples-
Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw, 15 A. (2d) 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940); Randal v.
Jersey Mortgage Investment Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 At. 865 (1931) ; ef. Teal v. Walker,
111 U. S. 242 (1884). The "title" states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, 'Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Vest Virginia. All
other states follow the "lien" theory. 2 W LTsi, MORTGAGE FoREC.osrU (5th ed. 1939)
§827.
7. The limited acknowledgment often accorded the "title" theory even in "title"
states is exemplified by the Tennessee court's pronouncement: "While in theory, the
rule prevails in Tennessee that a mortgagee takes legal title and is entitled to possession,
in practice the doctrine is only applied where necessary to protect the mortgagee's secur-
ity." Lieberman, Loveman and Cohn v. Knight, 153 Tenn. 268, 279, 283 S. W. 450, 453
(1925).
19411 1425
1426 THE YALE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 1424
a rent pledge generally can have rents applied to their debts only by peti-
tioning a court of equity for a rent receiver.8 But in view of difficulties in
proving the propriety of an equity receiver, 9 most mortgages seek to spell
out the mortgagee's right to rents.10 Yet clauses designed to effect an auto-
matic accrual of rents to the mortgagee upon default have universally been
denied that effect." Since these clauses do not seem to be innately unrea-
sonable or unconscionable, judicial refusal to carry out their clear and obvious
intent appears to be based upon some extraneous justification. Some courts
have found authority for outlawing rent pledges altogether in statutes
banning ejectment,12 confirming possession in the mortgagor,' 3 or declaring
mortgages to be liens.'
4
Where statutory aid is lacking, courts frequently resort to the rationale
that, since the clause imposes no duty upon the mortgagee to collect rents,
to grant these clauses the effect of automatic accrual would both deprive
the mortgagor of the right to use the rents and give him no assurance that
they would actually be collected and applied to his debt.'8 This argument
8. In "title" states an equity rent receiver may generally be procured immediately
upon default; whereas in "lien" states an equity rent receiver is frequently not available
until after foreclosure.
9. A petition for an equity rent receiver will generally be granted only upon a
sufficient showing of waste, inadequacy of security, and the mortgagor's insolvency. See
p. 1438 infra.
10. Rent clauses take three forms: (1) Conveyances of the property together with
all rents, income, and profits, and empowering the mortgagee to take possession and col-
lect rents upon default; (2) Assignments of the rents effective upon default with power
to enter and collect rents; (3) Provisions authorizing the appointment of a receiver to
collect rents and apply them to the secured debt.
11. Dow v. Memphis & L. R. Ry., 124 U. S. 652 (1888) ; Moncrieff v. Hare, 38 Colo.
221, 87 Pac. 1082 (1906); Mississippi Valley & W. Ry. v. United States Express Co.,
81 Ill. 534 (1876) ; New York Security and Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas and Electric Co,,
159 N. Y. 137, 53 N. E. 758 (1899) ; Dick and Reuteman Co. v. Jem Realty Co., 225 Wis.
428, 274 N. W. 416 (1937).
12. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Sutton, 278 Mich. 457, 270 N. W.
748 (1936) ; Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 364 (1877).
13. Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242 (1884) ; Couper v. Shirley, 75 Fed. 168 (C. C. A.
9th, 1896) ; Wolford v. Cook, 71 Minn. 77, 73 N. W. 706 (1898); cf. Buell v. Bucking-
ham & Co., 16 Iowa 284 (1864). See also UNIFORM REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ACT, § 2,
pt. 1. For a comparison of these statutes, see Smith v. Grilk, '64 N. D. 163, 250 N. W.
787 (1933).
14. OKLA. STAT. (Harlow 1931) §§ 9491, 10909, 10940, 10945, 10946; Rives v. Mineks
Hotel Co., 167 Okla. 500, 30 P. (2d) 911 (1934). A few states have utilized statutory
declarations of this nature to limit rent pledges to such income from the property as is
needed to prevent "waste" [Nusbaum v. Shapero, 249 Mich. 252, 228 N. W. 785 (1930);
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Investment Co., 190 Minn. 144, 251 N. W. 129
(1933) ; see also Carey and Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: Ill. Re-
ceiverships (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 717]; but have barred the pledging of income to pay
principle or interest. Flower v. King, 189 Minn. 461, 250 N. W. 43 (1933).
15. See, e.g., Matter of Kidd, 161 Misc. 631, 292 N. Y. Supp. 888 (Surr. Ct. 193o).
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obviously lacks realism. It does not seem likely that a mortgagee after
default would fail to apply rents to a debt if they were made available to
him. Courts furthermore fear that if they permit an automatic accrual, logic
would require imposing a constructive trust upon rents collected and ex-
pended by the mortgagor after default.' But the inequity of subsequently
imposing a constructive trust might be avoided by requiring a mortgagor
in default to remit the net rents to the mortgagee and to render periodical
accountings of legitimate expense.
The real basis for the court's refusal to give effect to rent clauses is
probably to be found in the traditional policy of protecting the mortgagor's
possession. The gradual shift of the mortgagee's status from that of a holder
of legal title to that of a secured creditor has divested the mortgagee of any
inherent claim to possession. And as a creditor, many courts feel that he
should not be allowed to invade an owner's sacred right to possession by any
method short of foreclosure and sale. But the ultimate benefit of denying
a mortgagee's claim to rent accrues not so often to the mortgagor as to his
general creditors. Defaulting, mortgagors are usually insolvent and besieged
by unsecured claimants, the most persistent of whom are likely to be paid
off from rents arising from the mortgagor's possession. Hence the effect of
judicial policy is apt to resolve itself into a denial prior to foreclosure of the
mortgagee's precedence over general creditors to which his contracted security
should entitle him.
Even where the right to pledge or assign rents has been upheld, courts
require some action on the part of the mortgagee after default to reduce the
rents to possession.' 7 This requirement of action tantamount to the assump-
tion of possession arises as a corollary to the construction of the rent pledge
as an inchoate or executory pledge.18 The requisite action may consist of
physical entry into possession and actual collection of rents,1 9 formal demand
16. The conventional argument is expressed in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Liberdar
Holding Corp., 74 F. (2d) 50, 51 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); ci. Westinghouse Electric and
Manufacturing Co. v. WNreikel, 110 N. J. Eq. 347, 160 At. 48 (1932).
17. Shallcross v. Rankin, 82 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936); Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association v. Bank of Amador County, 135 Cal. App. 714,
28 P. (2d) 86 (1933); Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Larsen, 178 Ga. 255, 173 S.
E. 125 (1934) ; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ingels, 217 Iowa 705, 251 N. W.
630 (1933) ; Fahnestock v. Clark Henry Corp., 151 Misc. 593. 272 N. Y. Supp. 49 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Shelly Seed Corp., 46 Ohio App.
548, 189 N. E. 654 (1933).
18. It is the practice in Iowa to record mortgages containing rent pledges both as
chattel mortgages and real estate mortgages. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bar-
low, 217 Iowa 323, 251 N. W. 501 (1933). A rent clause has occasionally been referred
to as an equitable chattel mortgage on after-acquired property. Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Shelly Seed Corp., 46 Ohio App. 548, 189 N. E. 654 (1933).
19. 2 Jo-as, 'MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 978. Stevens v. McCurdy, 124 Ga. 455,
52 S. E. 762 (1905).
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upon the mortgagor for possession and rejection,2 0 or securing the appoint-
ment of a receiver.
21
The requirement of physical entrance into possession is essentially the
same as the common law imposed on the mortgagee in the absence of a rent
pledge.2 2 This requirement apparently reflects the traditional judicial hesi-
tancy to permit the severance of rents from possession.2 3  Courts are in
substantial agreement that where the terminology of a pledge or conveyance
is used, possession must be shown to perfect the mortgagee's right to rents,
and, even where words of assignment are used, most courts hold that an
assignment in a mortgage is intended only as security and not as an absolute
assignment."'
Unrealistic consequences ensue in jurisdictions which stress the formal dis-
tinction between pledges and assignments of rent.2-3 A pledge is regarded as a
bailment requiring delivery of possession, actual or constructive, to effect
the transaction.2 6 Assignment, on the other hand, is deemed a transfer of
title giving the mortgagee an absolute right to rents upon default, without
the condition that he obtain possession of the premises. 2  Courts which achieve
different results based on this distinction seem to place an inordinately high
premium upon the phraseology of the instrument. If the rents are available
in the one case without the requirement of obtaining possession, no policy
ground is perceivable for denying them in the other.
The same distinction arises in another guise when assignments of rent
made in instruments ancillary to the mortgage are held effective after default
20. Long Island Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Brown, 171 Misc. 15, 11 N.
Y. S. (2d) 793 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See p. 1431 infra.
21. The effect of receivership clauses will be considered separately. See p. 1438
infra.
22. Fink and Sons Co. v. John Huss Co., 16 N. J. Misc. 31, 195 Atl. 816 (Mon-
mouth Cty. Sup. Ct. 1938).
23. It is frequently asserted that retention of possession is the test of the right to
rents. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Begin, 59 Ohio App. 5, 16 N. E. (2d)
1015 (1938). Possession, however, is a concept susceptible to a variety of interpretations.
24. Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494 (1888); It re
Banner, 149 Fed. 936 (S. D. N. Y. 1907); Hall v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P.
(2d) 659 (1932) ; Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N. Y. 217, 119 N. E. 405, 4 A. L. R. 1400, 1405
(1918); Simon v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 126 S. W. (2d) 682 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
25. Michigan courts have relied upon a statute validating rent assignment clauses
to hold that such a clause transfers title upon default. MicH. Co. p. LAws (1929) §§ 13498,
13499. Abrin v. Equitable Trust Co., 271 Mich. 535, 261 N. W. 85 (1935); Security
Trust Co. v. Sloman, 252 Mich. 266, 233 N. W. 216 (1930).
26. Colonial Trust Co. v. Stone Harbor Electric Light and Power Co., 280 Fed,
245 (D. N. J. 1922); Myers v. Brown, 92 N. J. Eq. 348, 112 Atl. 844 (1921).
27. New Jersey National Bank & Trust Co. v. Morris, 108 N. J. Eq. 412, 155 Atl.
782 (1931); Paramount Building & Loan Association v. Sacks, 107 N. J. Eq. 328, 152
Ad. 457 (1930).
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without an assumption of possession by the mortgagee.2 Some courts hold
that a subsequent agreement respecting possession or rents will be enforced
according to its terms, even though controverting the general statutory policy
of maintaining the mortgagor in possession until a foreclosure ale.3 Agree-
ments made after default are generally effective as assignments in praesenti
on the theory that title to the rents passes at the time the instrument is
executed.30 But there is considerable diversity of opinion as to the effect
to be accorded separate rent assignments executed simultaneously with the
mortgage, or subsequently but before default. By regarding such assignments
as mortgages on after-acquired property, they may be held effective with-
out action after default.3 ' But the main current of opinion favors requiring
the mortgagee to take possession before holding such assignments absolute.
Separate lease assignments may prove an effective device in certain juris-
dictions for achieving the automatic accrual of rents upon default which
courts deny in the case of rent pledges and assignments. 2 - A separate assign-
ment of "leases previously made or to be made" which was executed con-
temporaneously with the mortgage has been held operative without action
after default notwithstanding a statute confirming possession and the right
to rents of the mortgaged property in the mortgagor.3 Notice to the tenant
28. Harris v. Lesster, 35 App. Div. 462, 54 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't 1893) ; cf.
Farmers' Trust Co. v. Prudden, 84 Minn. 126, 86 N. W. 887 (1901).
29. Massachusetts 'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Sutton, 278 Mich. 457, 270 N. W.
748 (1936); Reichert v. Guaranty Trust Co., 261 Mich. 315, 246 N. W. 132 (1933);
Rabourn v. Benz, 217 S. W. 49 (Mfo. 1919); Douglass v. Thompson, 35 Nev. 196, 127
Pac. 561 (1912); Brundage v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 11 Wash. 277, 39
Pac. 666 (1895). A separate agreement providing that the rents shall be collected by
the mortgagee and applied to the payment of the debt while the mortgagor remains in
possession, is thus recognized in several jurisdictions. Lebensburger v. Scofield, 155 Fed.
85 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Sollie v. Outlaw, 210 Ala. 419, 98 So. 127 (1923); Goodvin
v. Keney, 49 Conn. 563 (182); Bolton v. Starr, 223 Ill. App. 39 (1921); Dailey v.
Doherty, 237 Mfass. 365, 129 N. E. 678 (1921); White v. Wagner, 31 Misc. 403, 65
N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
30. Fox v. Detroit Trust Co., 285 Mich. 669, 281 N. IV. 399 (1938) ; Netzeband v.
Knickneyer-Fleer Realty and Investment Co., 103 S. W. (2d) 520 (St. Louis Ct. of
App. 'Mo. 1937); cf. Fisher v. Norman Apartments, Inc., 101 Colo. 173, 72 P. (2d)
1092 (1937), (1938) 47 YALE L. .. 1000.
31. Simon v. State ' Mutual Life Assurance Co., 126 S. AV. (2d) 632 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) is one of the few cases indicating that a separate rent assignment executed prior
to default may possibly, by analogy to a chattel mortgage on after-acquired property,
be held absolute upon default without further action by the mortgagee. Contra: In re
Berdick, 56 F. (2d) 288 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
32. In Franzen v. Kinney Co., Inc., 218 Wis. 53, 259 N. AV. 850 (1935) a lease as-
signment executed simultaneously with the execution of the mortgage was held to become
absolute upon notice by the mortgagee to the tenant after default. See Note (1935) 19
.MAXQ. L. REv. 262.
33. Fargo Building & Loan Association v. Rice, 66 N. D. 100, 262 N. W. 345 (1935).
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of the assignment and default is generally required in such cases, however,
to protect the tenant against double rent liability.
3 4
The requirement that a mortgagee obtain possession in order to apply
rents to his debt usually entails the further requirement that he enter only
with the consent of the mortgagor.3 5 In New York, a mortgagee who entered
and collected rents under the authority of an assignment clause without the
consent of the mortgagor was deprived of the rents so collected and held
liable for damages as a trespasser.3" Since a mortgagee, even without a
rent clause, can always enter into possession with the consent of the mort-
gagor, the effect of such holdings apparently is to render nugatory the
consent embodied in the mortgage.
Nonetheless, decisions in New York3 7 and in the federal courts88 have
suggested a procedure short of receivership that would achieve the requisite
possession against an antagonistic mortgagor. A recent New York case 8 9
held that where the mortgagee had made a formal demand and had been
refused possession, under a clause that carefully spelled out the mortgagee's
34. Failure to give notice to the tenant was apparently the only reason that a lease
assignment made prior to default was held not absolute upon default. Buildings Devel-
opment Co. v. B/G Sandwich Shops, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 126 (1934). It should be noted,
however, that the Illinois court in this case was applying Wisconsin law.
35. The consent is usually express, although consent has occasionally been implied
from prolonged acquiescence. Cameron v. Ah Quong, 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 960 (1917) ;
Cory v. Santa Ynez Land & Improvement Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647 (1907). Com-
ment (1935) 35 COL. L. Ray. 1248.
36. Dime Savings Bank v. Altman, 246 App. Div. 823, 291 N. Y. Supp. 417 (2d
Dep't 1936), aff'd, 275 N. Y. 62, 9 N. E. (2d) 788 (1937), 50 HARV. L. RaV. 1322,
7 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 115; Steinberg v. Lincoln Savings Bank, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 1, 1935,
at 335. For a general discussion of rent assignments in New York, see Abelow, An His-
torical Analysis of Assignnents of Rent in New York (1936) 6 BROOKLyn L. Rnv. 25.
37. Dime Savings Bank v. Altman, 246 App. Div. 823, 291 N. Y. Supp. 417 (1936)
Schmalzl v. Peretta, 243 App. Div. 580, 276 N. Y. Supp. 224 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Fahne-
stock v. Clark Henry Corp., 151 Misc. 593, 272 N. Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Katz
v. Goodman, 136 Misc. 166, 238 N. Y. Supp. 700 (2d Dep't 1929); 148th St. Realty Co.
v. Conrad, 125 Misc. 142, 210 N. Y. Supp. 400 (2d Dep't 1925); cf. Grannis-Blair Audit
Co. v. Maddux, 167 Tenn. 297, 69 S. W. (2d) 238 (1934). But New York courts until
recently have failed to find the proper procedure evidenced in the facts of the particular
cases before them. Prudential Savings Bank v. Madewell Homes Corp., 241 App. Div.
771, 270 N. Y. Supp. 556 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Empire Trust Co. v. Kermacoe Realty Co.,
149 Misc. 66, 266 N. Y. Supp. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Dime Savings Bank v. Fox, 147
Misc. 24, 264 N. Y. Supp. 262 (Mun. Ct. of N. Y. 1933) ; Emigrant Industrial Savings
Bank v. North American Radio Corp., 140 Misc. 639, 251 N. Y. Supp. 542 (Mut. Ct.
of N. Y. 1931).
38. Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494 (1888) ; Sage v.
Memphis & Little Rock Ry., 125 U. S. 361 (1888); Dow v. Memphis & L. R. Ry.,
124 U. S. 652 (1888) ; In re Brose, 254 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; In re Israelson,
230 Fed. 1000 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
39. Long Island Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Brown, 171 Misc. 15, 11 N. Y.
S. (2d) 793 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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right to possession, the court would construe this as constructive possession
rendering the assignment absolute. This recognition of the expressed intent
of the parties, if approved in other courts, would afford a greater degree of
protection for mortgagees, and would enable both mortgagors and mort-
gagees to avoid the expenses of receivership. It also would permit a mort-
gagee to delay foreclosure until market conditions had improved with the
assurance that the rents would not be milked by the mortgagor or secured
by a receiver of a junior mortgagee.
THE MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION
The difficulties discussed above can easily be circumvented if the mort-
gagee can persuade the mortgagor to surrender possession voluntarily under
some form of extension or possession agreement. Where such an agreement
is possible, it is advisable to spell out in detail the various rights and duties
which each party assumes under the transfer. In this way the transfer can
be rendered mutually more acceptable, and the parties can minimize the
necessity of a court's subsequently supplying unspecified and unintended
conditions.
In the.absence of such an agreement the mortgagee's status is governed
by common law principles. A mortgagee upon entering into possession as-
sumes a new legal relation with three classes of persons: (1) the mortgagor;
(2) the mortgagor's tenant; (3) the junior lienors and general creditors
of the mortgagor.40
As against the mortgagor, the mortgagee's right to rents due and accrued
attaches at the moment of entry.41 In entering possession 42 the mortgagee
assumes extensive responsibilities analogous to those of outright ownership,
and this extensive authority measures the scope of obligations imposed upon
him. The mortgagee is held accountable to the mortgagor for applying net
40. The relations of the mortgagee in possession with junior lienors, and general
creditors of the mortgagee are discussed in connection with receiverships, p. 1442 fiura.
41. There is a conflict in decisions as to whether the entry of the mortgagee, to give
him the rights of a mortgagee in possession must be made under the mortgage or whether
entry under some other right will suffice. Harrington v. Feddersen, 208 Iowa 564, 226
N. V. 110 (1929); Rogers v. Benton, 39 IMinn. 39, 38 N. W. 765 (18 3). See also 3
POMlEROY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919) § 1215. The weight of authority favors
requiring the mortgagee to take possession as mortgagee. Robinson v. Smith, 128 S. W.
(2d) 27 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939), aff'd, 130 S. W. (2d) 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
42. The determinative criterion of possession is not the collection of rents [Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association v. Bank of Amador County, 135 Cal.
App. 714, 28 P. (2d) 86 (1933); Stephens Investment Co. v. Berry Schools, 183 Ga.
132, 3 S. E. (2d) 68 (1939)], however, nor even occupation; it is rather the exercise
of management and control over the mortgaged property. Ireland v. United States Mort-
gage and Trust Co., 72 App. Div. 95, 76 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't 1902), Off'd, 175
N. Y. 491, 67 N. E. 1083 (1903); cf. Whitley v. Barnett, 151 Iowa 487, 131 X. W.
704 (1911).
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rents to the secured debt so as to reduce the amount which the mortgagor
must pay to redeem the property.43 The standard of accountability which
he must meet is expressed in various ways. But whether labeled a "con-
structive trustee,"' 44 a "quasi-trustee," 4 5 or a "pledgee in possession," 40 his
duty is substantially that of the reasonable owner -"to manage the property
in a reasonably prudent and careful manner so as to keep it in a good state
of preservation and productivity." 47 The reasonableness of the mortgagee's
action must be tested in light of general economic conditions, the character
of the premises,48 the likely duration of his possession, and the extent of
the mortgagor's residual interest.
49
The strictness with which this standard is administered determines in
large part the utility of this device for realizing upon the secured debt. On
the one hand, adequate protection against depletion of the value of Ills
property must be afforded the mortgagor. Unrestrained mortgagees in pos-
session are as likely to let the mortgaged premises fall into disrepair as are
beleaguered mortgagors. On the other hand, the effectiveness of this device
will be impaired if the mortgagee is threatened with too great a potential
liability. The mortgagee's responsibility is generally limited to the rents
actually received, or to those which might have been received by the use
of reasonable diligence.50 Only where the mortgagee is unable to make an
accounting, or has negligently or willfully mismanaged the property will he
be held liable for the full reasonable rental value of the premises.61 A mort-
43. The proper procedure for a redemptioner desiring to effectuate his equity is to
bring an action to redeem. Siegel v. Atterbury, 254 App. Div. 514, 5 N. Y. S. (2d)
372 (1st Dep't 1938); Becker v. McCrea, 193 N. Y. 423, 86 N. E. 463 (1908). Upon
redemption, the holder of the equity can require a complete accounting from the mort-
gagee in possession. Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 4 A.
(2d) 924 (1939). It is doubtful in most jurisdictions whether the rcdemptioner can
claim an accounting except by a bill to redeem.
44. Real Estate-Land Title and Trust Co. v. Homer Building and Loan Associa-
tion, 138 Pa. Super. 563, 10 A. (2d) 786 (1940) ; Travis v. Schonwald, 131 S. W. (2d)
827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
45. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw, 15 A. (2d) 711 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1940).
46. Spect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 437, 26 Pac. 203 (1891).
47. Bomar v. Smith, 195 S. W. 964, 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
48. Hays v. Christiansen, 105 Neb. 586, 181 N. W. 379 (1921).
49. Comment, Rights and Duties of a Mortgagee in Possession (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 1248.
50. Denham v. Lack, 139 S. W. (2d) 243 (Ark. 1940); Williams Realty and Loan
Co. v. Simmons, 3 S. E. (2d) 580 (Ga. 1939); Pioneer Building and Loan Association
v. Compton, 138 S. W. (2d) 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
51. The fact that the rents received are less than the full rental value does not ipso
facto demonstrate negligence. Pioneer Building and Loan Association v. Cowan, 123
S. W. (2d) 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). A mortgagee may reduce rent in order to retain
a tenant, and is not liable for occasional periods of vacancy during which he has made a
reasonable effort to re-let the property. Chapman v. Cooney, 25 R. I. 657, 57 Ati. 928
(1904). See 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1438; 2 WILTSIE, MoRTGaGE Four-
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gagee, failing expressly to stipulate otherwise, ordinarily may claim no
compensation for his services in managing the property and collecting the
rents. 2
A mortgagee is entitled to retain possession until the principal and interest
of his debt have been satisfied,53 or until a prior mortgagee asserts a superior
claim to possession, provided he is not dispossessed for mismanagement."
But he may surrender possession voluntarily at any time,55 although he is
not generally allowed to substitute a receiver prior to foreclosure. 3
Mortgagees, as a rule, are not allowed to collect rents from mortgagors
in actual possession.57  Where a defaulting mortgagor desires to retain
possession, however, a contract may be executed in the form of a lease,
under which the mortgagor, reciting a surrender of possession to the mort-
gagee, promises to pay a stipulated rental in return for the mortgagee's
promise to postpone foreclosure. Courts recognize such instruments to the
extent of granting a judgment against the mortgagor for unpaid rents,58 but
refuse to permit the mortgagee to dispossess the mortgagor by summary
proceeding for nonpayment of rents.50
The legal relations between the mortgagee and the tenant of the mortgagor
are largely determined by whether the lease precedes or succeeds the exe-
CLOSURE (5th ed. 1939) § 1238. But a mortgagee is liable for excessive leniency with
tenants [Carroll v. Tomlinson, 192 Ill. 398, 61 N. E. 484 (1901)], preventable injury to
property [Baumgard v. Bowman, 31 Ohio App. 266, 167 N. E. 166 (1928)] and penal-
ties for nonpayment of taxes [Moshier v. Norton, 100 Il1. 63 (1881)]. Insurance pre-
miums [Land Finance Corp. v. Giorgio, 245 App. Div. 836, 280 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2d
Dep't 1935)], taxes [Wise v. Layman, 197 Ind. 393, 150 N. E. 368 (1926)] and expense
for necessary repairs [Burns v. Williams, 147 Ark. 608, 2 S. AN. 726 (1921)) must be
paid by the mortgagee and may be credited against the rents.
52. Kinkead v. Peet, 153 Iowa 199, 132 N. W. 1095 (1911) ; Pennsylvania Co. for
Insurance on Lives v. Powers, 122 N. J. Eq. 370, 194 Ad. 86 (1937). Contra: Barry v.
Dow, 240 Mass. 419, 134 N. E. 367 (1922).
53. In re Lindsay, 12 F. Supp. 625 (N. D. Iowa 1935). See also 2 Jo;eS, .MoMT-
GAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 887.
54. Zajic v. Sikora Realty Corp., 252 App. Div. 343, 299 N. Y. Supp. 227 (2d Dep't
1937).
55. Moskow v. Fine, 292 Mass. 233, 198 N. E. 150 (1935).
56. Hays v. Christiansen, 105 Neb. 586, 181 N. W. 379 (1921); Colonial Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Anson Realty Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 267, 162 Aft. 111 (1932).
57. Lawyers Title and Guaranty Co. v. Tausig, 149 Misc. 594, 268 N. Y. Supp. 815
(Mfun. Ct. of N. Y., 1933). Contra: Long Island Bond and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v.
Brown, 171 Misc. 15, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 793 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
58. Grosvenor v. Holland, 158 Misc. 925, 288 N. Y. Supp. 105 (County Ct. 1936).
59. This distinction evidences the general judicial reluctance to permit a creditor to
dispossess the owner by means short of foreclosure. See Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co.
v. Tausig, 149 Misc. 594, 268 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Mun. CL of N. Y. 1933). Mortgagors
must be careful of the language in which such instruments are phrased, however, for
where a conveyance in satisfaction of the debt is recited, courts may construe them as
extinguishing all future interest of the mortgagor in the land, and regard him purely a
tenant of his erstwhile mortgagee, In re Ruckman, 13 F. Supp. 992 (E. D. I1. 1936).
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cution of the mortgage. This distinction emerges from common law concepts
of property. The mortgage after lease is deemed a transfer of the reversion
carrying rent as an incident to it and creating a privity of estate between
the mortgagee and tenant.60 On the basis of this privity the mortgagee
after default is able in a few states to assume the role of landlord by simple
notice to the lessee to pay future rents to him. 61 Such notice without entry
is regarded a sufficient assumption of possession to entitle the mortgagee
to the rents without attornment by the lessee. 62 This result finds justifi-
cation in the fact that a mortgagee who lends money in reliance upon a
lease and the rents accruing thereunder should be protected in applying the
rents to his debt. The tenant is protected in paying rents to the lessor prior
to notice, but thereafter he does so at the peril of being called upon to pay
them again to the mortgagee. 3  Since the mortgagee has stepped into the
shoes of the lessor, however, his right to actual possession is inferior to
that of the prior tenant, and the tenancy cannot be disturbed by ejectment,
foreclosure, or sale for the duration of its term.0 4
Different legal consequences follow where the lease succeeds the execution
of the mortgage. A subsequent tenant is said to occupy the mortgagor's
position and can hold no rights superior to those held by the mortgagor.
A mortgage transfers no reversion against subsequent tenants and there
is said to be no privity of estate or contract between the mortgagee and
lessee, out of which the conventional landlord-tenant relation can arise.0 5
At common law and in a few states, the mortgagee, upon default, has a right
to possession, can disavow the lease, treat the tenant as a trespasser and
resort to a suit in ejectment to evict him. 0
60. 2 JoFs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 979.
61. This right is only recognized in the few states which still adhere closely to com-
mon law doctrines. See, for example, Kenwood v. Dordick, 104 Pa. Super. 12, 159 AtI.
84 (1932).
62. 4 Anne c. 16 §§ 9, 10 (1705). Shallcross v. Rankin, 82 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A.
3d, 1936); Sherrod v. King, 226 Ala. 522, 147 So. 600 (1933); Noble v. Brooks, 224
Mass. 288, 112 N. E. 649 (1916); Burden v. Thayer, 44 Mass. 76 (1841); Bulger v.
Wilderman, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1931), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 269. See also 2 JoN1s,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 979; Comment, The Mortgagcc's Right to Rent After Bank-
ruptcy (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rav. 901.
63. Lingerfelt v. Gibson, 161 Tenn. 477, 32 S. W. (2d) 1047 (1930). Apparently
so long as a tenant complies with the provisions of his lease, he will not be required
to pay rent a second time. Baltimore Markets v. Real Estate Land Title and Trust Co.,
120 Pa. Super. 40, 181 Atl. 850 (1935).
64. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Turner, 95 Ala. 272, 11 So. 211
(1891).
65. This conventional common law doctrine still finds acceptance in a number of
states. Bank of Moundville v. Walsh, 216 Ala. 116, 112 So. 438 (1927) ; Beach v. Beach
Hotel Corp., 113 Conn. 716, 168 AtI. 785 (1933) ; Winnisimmet Trust Co. v, Libby, 247
Mass. 560, 142 N. E. 772 (1924).
66. Zimmern v. People's Bank of Mobile, 203 Ala. 21, 81 So. 811 (1919); West Side
Trust and Savings Bank v. Lepoten, 358 Ill. 631, 193 N. E. 462 (1934); Mayor of Ha-
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Where the mortgagee elects to retain the tenant in actual possession, he
may notify the tenant to pay rents to him, and the tenant must comply or
vacate the premises. 67 Compliance by the tenant in the face of threatened
eviction is not regarded as disloyalty to the lessor, since the tenant is thereby
simply recognizing a superior title which the lessor himself created., In
doctrinal terms, payment by the tenant constitutes the necessary atton-
ment ;69 and a new tenancy is thereby established which runs from year to
year.70 This result is necessary, since entry by the mortgagee is deemed
an eviction by title paramount which terminates the old lease and the tenant's
liability under it.71 Under the new lease which arises from an express or
implied attornment, the mortgagee is equipped with all the legal devices for
extracting rent from a tenant that are held by a conventional landlord. 2
If the tenant refuses to attorn, however, the mortgagee's remedy is to
foreclose, take possession of the property, if possible to do so peaceably,
or sue in ejectment. 73 A mortgagee generally has no right to rent until he
has obtained possession, and in no states can he obtain possession merely
by notifying the tenant to pay. Courts of equity have likewise relied upon
this rationale in refusing mortgagees injunctive relief.74 Consequently, prior
gerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560, 61 AtI. 467 (1905) ; Brown v. Aiken, 329 Pa. 566, 193
AUt. 441 (1938). See also 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) § 982; Comment, Eject-
vent as a Possessory Remedy to a Mortgagee on Default (1939) 4 U. or Nv.wAn L Fm-.
183; Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 269. But the prior mortgagee cannot distrain
for rents, sue in forceable detainer, nor bring an action for rent or for use and occupa-
tion against the tenant, since these remedies are reserved exclusively to the landlord.
Burke v. Willard, 243 'fass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923).
67. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Simplex Products Corp., 135 Ohio St. 501, 21
N. E. (2d) 585 (1939).
68. Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N. J. L. 157, 167 At. 747 (1933); Bulger v. Wilder-
man, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1930); Kimball v. Lockwood. 6 R. I. 138 (1859).
69. Jetzinger v. Consumers Stores, 26S Ill. App. 482 (1932); Hemminger v. Klap-
rath, 189 At. 363 (N. J. 1937); Reich v. Fordon, 234 App. Div. 110, 254 X. Y. Supp.
453 (1st Dep't 1931); Randal v. Jersey Mortgage Investment Co., 306 Pa. I, 15S Ad.
865 (1932). 6
70. West Side Trust and Savings Bank v. Lepoten, 358 IlL 631, 193 N. E. 462
(1934); Brown v. Aiken, 329 Pa. 566, 198 At. 441 (1938). Missouri provides by stat-
ute that the new tenancy shall run from month to month. Mo. STAT. A:;. (19291
§ 2584. Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 227 M.o. App. 1063, 56 S. W. (2d) 801
(1933). See also Berick, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents (1934) 8 U. oF C:N. L Ray.
250.
71. Highland Trust Co. v. Slotnick, 289 Mass. 119, 193 N. . 831 (1935); Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Priscilla Co., 281 Mass. 22, 183 N. E. 58 (1932); Burlington
Building and Loan Association v. Ayers, 108 Vt. 504, 189 Aft. 907 (1937). See also
2 JoNEs, 'MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 982.
72. -Manhattan Co. v. Nieberg, 164 Mfise. 618, 298 N. Y. Supp. 539 (Mun. Ct. of
N. Y. 1936). Under the new lease, the mortgagee in possession is like%,ise subject to
the landlord's liability. Moss v. Grove Hall Savings Bank, 290 Mass. 520, 195 N. B. 762
(1935) (mortgagee in possession held liable for damages resulting from leak in roof).
73. 2 jo-.xs, 'MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §§ 980, 981.
74. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw, 15 A. (2d) 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940).
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to foreclosure, if the mortgagor's tenant is belligerent, the mortgagee has
a right with no adequate means of enforcing it.7 Ejectment, even where
permitted, may be valueless because a foreclosure suit will be consummated
before a cumbersome suit in ejectment can be decided. 0 A few courts
indicate that the owner of mortgaged property will be held liable to the
mortgagee for rents received after notice, less reasonable expenses on the
property.7 7  But such a claim is illusory against an insolvent mortgagor.
The mortgagee is thus left to his chances of having a receiver appointed.
In most states, a subsequent tenant remains obligated to the mortgagor
until the foreclosure sale and, in many instances, until the statutory period
for redemption has run.78 Eviction as a rule occurs only where the tenant
is joined as a defendant in the foreclosure suit."9 Where he is not so joined,
the sale merely operates to transfer his duty to pay rent to the purchaser
of the 'property.8 0 Voluntary attornment to the mortgagee prior to fore-
closure is legally impossible because the mortgagee has no right to possession
upon which to base an attornment.8 But where a mortgagor has volun-
tarily placed a mortgagee in possession, the mortgagee is entitled as quasi-
trustee of the lessor to enforce his right to rents and to oust a non-paying
tenant by summary proceeding.
8 2
A problem of considerable importance is the extent to which a mortgagee
entering possession is bound by rent reductions, prepayments of rent, and
75. Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923).
76. See Notes (1932) 45 HARV. L. Rzv. 901, 903, (1931) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 269,
274.
77. Randal v. Jersey Mortgage Investment Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 At. 865 (1932).
78. Bennos v. Waderlow, 291 Mich. 595, 289 N. W. 267 (1939); cf. Local Realty
Board v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P. (2d) 770 (1938). See also Comment, Remedies
Against "Milking" of Property by Mortgagors (1933) 46 HARV. L. Rav. 491.
79. Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N. Y. 354, 186 N. E. 862 (1933);
Knickerbocker Oil Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 234 App. Div. 199, 254 N. Y. Supp. 506
(2d Dep't 1931); Curry v. Bacharach Quality Shops, Inc., 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435
(1921); Virges v. Gregory Co., 97 Wash. 333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917). Contra: I-Iecht
v. Dettman, 56 Iowa 679, 7 N. W. 495 (1881). Decisions conflict as to the time at which
the eviction of a tenant occurs. New York holds that only the actual sale on foreclosure
where the tenant is joined therein constitutes eviction. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Childs Co., 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295, 14 A. L. R. 658, 664 (1921); Capone v.
Hinck, 163 Misc. 47, 296 N. Y. Supp. 346 (Mun. Ct. of N. Y. 1937). Michigan, on the
other hand, follows the rule that the filing of a foreclosure by a prior mortgagee is an
eviction, even if the lessee is not a party to the foreclosure. Dolese v. Bellows-Claude
Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57, 245 N. W. 569 (1932), (1933) 32 MicH. L. Rav. 119.
80. Wilson v. Wilson, 220 Iowa 878, 263 N. W. 830 (1935); Tabor State Bank v.
Jacobs, 53 S. D. 635, 222 N. W. 141 (1928) ; cf. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah
297, 85 P. (2d) 770 (1938). Contra: New York Life Insurance Co. v. Simplex Products
Corp., 135 Ohio St. 501, 21 N. E. (2d) 585 (1939).
81. Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868). See also 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed.
1928) § 983.
82. Goodnow v. Pope, 31 Misc. 475, 64 N. Y. Supp. 394 (App. Term 1900). As to
the mortgagee's rights under a lease assignment, see note 27 supra.
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lease cancellations effected by the mortgagor for a cash consideration. Such
agreements are standard devices by which hard-pressed mortgagors pocket
the future earning capacity of the debt security and deliver to the assuming
mortgagee the empty shell of the pledged asset. Courts are torn between
preserving the mortgagor's powers of ownership, protecting a tenant who
has entered into such an agreement in good faith, and safeguarding the
mortgagee against these impairments of his security.
Collusive agreements effected in anticipation of foreclosure with the intent
of defrauding the mortgagee are generally set aside.83 But practical diffi-
culties of proving fraud and collusion usually render this relief ineffectual.
More adequate protection against rent reductions and prepayments of rent
is found in the right of the mortgagee, in states still adhering to common
law doctrines to disaffirm subsequent leases and demand the reasonable value
of use and occupation from the tenant retaining possession.8 4 Such action,
however, creates the reciprocal privilege in the tenant to vacate the premises.85
entailing a period of vacancy until the mortgagee secures a new lessee-
at a possibly reduced rental. A mortgagee may thus still lose the benefits
of favorable leases on the property. While mortgagees may not disaffirm
a prior lease, courts are likely to abrogate subsequent agreements for the
prepayment of rents to the mortgagor and hold a tenant liable to the mort-
gagee under the original terms of the lease. s3 Reasonable rent reductions,
if effected before default,87 are often held binding upon mortgagees.
In states which regard the mortgage as only a lien upon the pledged
premises, mortgagees fare less well. The payment of rent in advance is
construed as the purchase of a leasehold,88 rendering the tenant immune to
claims by the mortgagee prior to the foreclosure suit. Likewise, rent reduc-
tions are regarded a matter of the owner's prerogative.
Lease cancellations by mortgagors pose an even more perplexing problem
for mortgagees. The impairment of a mortgagee's security is obvious, par-
ticularly where a loan has been made in reliance upon a prior lease. Yet
where such releases are executed prior to default, mortgagees find them-
83. Cassady v. Williams, 234 Ala. 299, 174 So. 485 (1937); Boteler v. Leber, 112
N. J. Eq. 441, 164 At. 572 (1933); Nerwal Realty Corp. v. 9th Avenue-31st Street
Corp., 154 Misc. 565, 278 N. Y. Supp. 766 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Gaynor v. Blewett, 82 Wis.
313, 52 N. W. 313 (1892).
84. Belleville Savings Bank v. Souris, 266 Ill. App. 565 (1932) ; Bank of Manhattan
Trust Co. v. 571 Park Avenue Corp., 263 N. Y. 57, 188 N. E. 156 (1933) ; State ex rd.
Coker v. District Ct. of Tulsa County, 159 Okla. 10, 11 P. (2d) 495 (1932).
85. Even where mortgagees have attempted to avoid an eviction by resort to devices
such as quitclaim deeds executed during the redemption period, courts have still regard-
ed the sale an eviction entitling the lessee to vacate. Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co.,
261 MIich. 57, 245 N. AV. 569 (1932).
86. Colter Realty Co. v. Primer Realty Corp., N. Y. L. J., p. 2837, col. 1 (App. Div.,
1st Dep't, June 25, 1941); Boteler v. Leber, 112 N. J. Eq. 441, 164 At. 572 (1933).
87. Kenney v. 149 North Avenue Corp., 115 N. J. Eq. 314, 170 Ad. 8- (1934).
88. Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 215 N. W. 571 (197) ; cf. Zimmerman v. Wal-
green Co., 215 Wis. 491, 255 N. W. 534 (1934).
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selves virtually without judicial assistance.8 9 Even where a lease is sur-
rendered after default, resort to courts frequently proves abortive.0 0 It has
been suggested"' that lease cancellation might be enjoined as constituting
a species of waste. While functional justification for such a remedy seems
apparent, its application would probably be limited to prior leases on grounds
that a mortgagee holds no reversionary interest in subsequent leases, and
that entrance by a mortgagee constitutes an eviction, entitling a subsequent
tenant to avoid the lease and vacate. Moreover, since injunctive relief is
generally restricted to specific threatened action, a series of suits might
prove necessary to accord mortgagees any substantial protection. This short-
coming might be avoided, however, by a court more attentive to the scope
of protection needed here. It would seem consistent with the judicial policy
of preventing spoliation of property to extend more effective protection to
mortgagees against lease destruction by unscrupulous mortgagors.
RENT RECEIVERSHIPs
Where a mortgagee is unable to secure possession of the mortgaged
property, or is unwilling to assume the responsibilities that possession en-
tails, rents may frequently be procured by applying to a court of equity for
a rent receiver. While the traditional equity receivership has been condi-
tioned upon a showing of inadequate security, insolvency on the part of the
mortgagor,9 2 or waste, 93 these factors assume less importance in many juris-
89. See, for example, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. State Building and Loan Associa-
tion, 199 Ark. 19, 132 S. W. (2d) 837 (1939).
90. Moran v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry., 32 Fed. 878 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1887).
Some courts have indicated that such agreements will be abrogated as fraudulent con-
veyances where a mortgagee assembles the requisite proof of collusion and intentional
fraud. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. 571 Park Avenue Corp., 263 N. Y. 57, 188 N. E.
156 (1933). But few mortgagees, in practice, can acquire sufficient proof to avail them-
selves of this relief. In a few title states, courts have evidenced a willingness to nullily
lease cancellations effected after default, without a showing of collusion, on the theory
that execution of such agreements is beyond the power of the mortgagor and tenant.
First National Bank of Chicago v. Gordon, 287 II. App. 83, 4 N. E. (2d) 504 (1936).
In such jurisdictions, a mortgagee must act promptly to avoid the charge of laches, since
courts are reluctant to force tenants to pay rent for benefits never received.
91. See Comment, Remedies Against "Milking" of Property by Mortgagors (1933)
46 HARv. L. REv. 491.
92. Courts which recognize inadequacy and insolvency as grounds for appointing
an equity receiver place varying degrees of stress upon these two factors. While New
York and Iowa apparently favor a showing of inadequacy over insolvency [First Trust
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Jansen, 217 Iowa 439, 251 N. W. 711 (1933) ; Cohn v. Bart-
lett, 182 App. Div. 245, 169 N. Y. Supp. 604 (1st Dep't 1918)], most courts require
both to be demonstrated. Totten v. Harlowe, 90 F. (2d) 377 (App. D. C. 1937),
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. McCartney, 20 F. Supp. 37 (E. D.
Ill. 1937) ; Erwin v. West, 105 Colo. 71, 99 P. (2d) 201 (1939); Land Title & Trust Co.
v. Kellogg, 73 N. J. Eq. 524, 68 At. 80 (1907).
93. In Wisconsin and Minnesota, demonstration of waste is a sine quca non for the
appointment of a rent receiver. Marshall & Illsley Bank v. Cady, 76 Minn. 112, 78 N. W.
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dictions where receiverships have become statutory, 4 or where clauses in
mortgages expressly waiving these requisites are recognized.05 While it is
clear that a receiver will not be appointed where the anticipated liquidated
value of the property exceeds the amount of the debt,"" it is not certain that
a receiver will be appointed where the liquidated value falls short of the
debt. Mortgagees can claim no absolute right to a receiver, and cannut
bind a court by stipulations in the mortgage instrument.0 7 While the ap-
pointment of a receiver is not dependent upon the mortgage's covering
rents,98 the presence of rent assignment and receivership clauses in the mort-
gage increases the likelihood that a receiver will be appointed.0 2 Within the
bounds of these generalizations exist widely varying requirements, tests and
criteria for determining the propriety of appointing a receiver in the par-
ticular case. Some courts, hostile to impairing the mortgagor's rights
of ownership, or fearful of converting the court into a debt collection agency
for indigent mortgagees,100 rigidly restrict the use of receiverships, other
jurisdictions grant receiverships almost as a matter of course.
978 (1899) ; Crosby v. Keilman, 206 Wis. 252, 239 N. W. 431 (1931). The fact that the
pledged asset is inadequate security, or that the mortgagor is insolvent is deemed irrele-
vant, since the mortgagee is assumed to have foreseen these risks when he made the
loan. The rigor of this requirement, however, is somewhat lessened by defining "wvaste"
to include "threatened waste." Dick & Reuteman Co. v. Hunholz, 213 Wis. 499, 252
N. IV. 180 (1934). In this way, the insolvency and inadequacy tests may, in practice,
be incorporated into the requisite showing of waste.
94. For a complete list of the receivership statutes, see Comment, Powtr "I First
Mortgagee to Secure Rents Vithout Forcclosing (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 107, 111, n. 27.
Where statutes provide that a receiver may be appointed in case of inadequacy, insolvency,
or waste, the tendency of courts is to deny appointment purely on the basis of a receiver-
ship clause in the mortgage instrument. Garretson Inv. Co. v. Arndt, 144 Cal. 64, 77
Pac. 770 (1904). Contra: Watts' Adm'r v. Smith, 250 Ky. 617, 63 S. W. (2d) 795
(1933).
95. Where rents have been assigned, the equitable factors occasionally assume less
significance. See cases cited in 2 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORCLOSURE (5th ed. 1939) § 561.
A few courts grant receiverships where the mortgage assigns the rents regardless of
the'adequacy of the security. Ortengren v. Rice, 104 Ill. App. 428 (1902). In such juris-
dictions, the equitable requisites are reserved for situations where the rents are not
pledged. Trustees of Schools of Tp. No. 27 v. Thompson, 298 Ill. App. 3S6, 19 N. E.
(2d) 219 (1939).
96. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broeker, 166 Ind. 576, 77 N. E. 1092 (1906); Rogers v.
Southern Pine Lumber Co., 21 Te.. Civ. App. 48, 51 S. W. 26 (1899). See also 2 WVi.L-
sIE, MORTGAGE FoPzcLosunn (5th ed. 1939) §§ 562, 569. Illinois courts have indicated,
however, that where the mortgage contains a rent clause, a receiver will be appointed
regardless of the adequacy of the security. Ortengren v. Rice, 104 Ill. App. 428 (1902).
97. Straus v. Barbee, 262 'Mich. 113, 247 N. W. 125 (1933).
98. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mlack, 347 Ill. 480, 180 N. E. 412 (1932). See
Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1003.
99. Martorano v. Spicola, 110 Fla. 55, 148 So. 385 (1933) ; Pizer v. Herzig, 121 App.
Div. 609, 106 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1907). See Note (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1405.
100. See Carey and Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures" 11L
Receiverships (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rnv. 717.
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In some states particular types of property are accorded special treatment.
Where the property involved is a homestead or a farm, and the dispossession
of the mortgagor would create great hardship without a corresponding benefit
to the mortgagee, a receivership is frequently denied. 1 1 But where special
equities favor the mortgagee, the fact that the mortgaged property is a
homestead does not necessarily prove an obstacle. 10 2 Where the mortgagor
conducts a business on the mortgaged premises, cases split on the propriety
of appointing a receiver to take over the business.'0 3 If the rent element
predominates among the component factors making up gross income, as is
the case in apartment houses, a receivership may be more readily justified
than in the case of hotels, 10 4 garages,10 and parking lots, 1 where the rent
factor may represent but a small fraction of receipts. Attempts to distinguish
from gross income that portion earned by the mortgaged property can
result in little more than an arbitrary estimate.
Where courts have granted a mortgagee's petition for a receivership, a
problem arises as to which rents the receiver may collect. There is little
controversy regarding rents accruing from the mortgaged property between
the date of his appointment and the date of sale.10 7 In some jurisdictions,
however, his claim to rents relates back to the commencement of the fore-
closure action, 08 or to the date of the petition for his appointment. 10 9 The
receiver's right to back rents due and uncollected at the date of his appoint-
ment is less clear.110 The receiver's claim to these rents may prevail in
some instances against the owner"' and junior mortgagees," 2 but courts
101. First Trust Co. v. Bauer, 128 Neb. 725, 260 N. W. 194 (1935) ; Crosby v. Keil-
man, 206 Wis. 252, 239 N. W. 431 (1931); see Rehberger v. Wegener, 107 N. J. Eq.
391, 152 At. 700 (1930). Contra: Rankin-Whitham State Bank v. Mulcahey, 344 Ill.
99, 176 N. E. 366 (1931); H. 0. L. C. v. Benner, 150 Kan. 108, 91 P. (2d) 9 (1939).
102. Rehberger v. Wegener, 107 N. J. Eq. 391, 152 At. 700 (1930). See also 2 WILT-
SIE, MORTGAGE FoRECLosuRE (5th ed. 1939) § 574.
103. See Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 701.
104. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Saginaw Hotels Co., 259 Mich. 254, 242 N. W. 906 (1932).
105. Fairchild v. Gray, 136 Misc. 704, 242 N. Y. Supp. 192 (County Ct. 1930).
106. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Mishol Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 27, 1934,
at 441, col. 5.
107. Rankin-Whitham State Bank v. Mulcahey, 344 Il1. 99, 176 N. E. 366 (1931)
Greenwich Savings Bank v. Samotas, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 772 (Mun. Ct. of N. Y., 1940).
108. Greenleaf v. Bates, 223 Iowa 274, 271 N. W. 614 (1937).
109. First Trust Joint-Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Jansen, 217 Iowa 439, 251 N.
W. 711 (1933).
110. See cases cited in (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1211, 1216, n. 41.
111. Touroff v. Weeks, 155 Misc. 577, 278 N. Y. Supp. 867 (City Ct. 1935); cf.
Watts' Adm'r v. Smith, 250 Ky. 617, 63 S. W. (2d) 796 (1933). Contra: New Order
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 222 Chancellor Ave., 106 N. J. Eq. 1, 149 Atl. 525 (1930).
112. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fulton Development Corp., 265 N. Y. 348, 193 N. E.
169 (1934). In New Jersey a prior mortgagee holding an assignment clause may have
a receiver appointed who may collect back rents as against the claim of a junior lienor
[Vol. 50: 14241440
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are likely to accord preferential treatment to prior attaching creditors of the
mortgagor.' 13 Rents collected in advance by the receiver for periods subse-
quent to the termination of the receivership must generally be paid over
to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. 14 Some states bar collection of
rents by a receiver during the redemption period, 1 0 while others restrict
his collection to this period exclusively.'1 0
The right of a receiver to disavow leases reserving unduly low rentals
and to demand the reasonable value of use and occupation from tenants in
possession has attracted considerable attention during the last decade.11 7
While some courts in the past have construed the appointment of a receiver
as an "equitable ejectment" and have permitted receivers to reject existing
leases and demand a "fair and reasonable" rent from tenants, 18 the present
judicial trend has been towards restricting the lease rejection power to
instances where fraud and collusion are shown.110 Although this policy has
frequently had the effect of saddling mortgagees with unremunerative leases,
it has at the same time afforded them a measure of protection against col-
in p6ssession. Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sacks, 107 N. J. Eq. 328, 152 Ad. 457
(1930).
113. In re Barbizon Plaza, 3 F. Supp. 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); People's Trust Co.
v. Goodell, 134 Misc. 692, 236 N. Y. Supp. 549 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
114. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 225 Mo. App. 855, 32 S. V. (2d) 126 (1930);
Cowen v. Arnold, 58 Hun 437, 12 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1890).
115. Ginsberg v. Bennett, 101 Colo. 121, 71 P. (2d) 419 (1937); Aley v. Schroeder,
144 Kan. 739, 62 .P. (2d) 885 (1936) ;'Fredin v. Cascade Realty Co., 205 Minn. 256,
285 N. IV. 615 (1939); Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 P. (2d) 770
(1938), (1939) 52 HAv. L. REv. 843. Contra: Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. McCartney,
20 F. Supp. 37 (E. D. Ill. 1937), (1938) 26 ILt_ BAR J. 251; Petersen v. Jurras, 2 Cal.
(2d) 253, 40 P. (2d) 257 (1935) ; Liss v. Harris, 304 Ill. App. 173, 26 N. E. (2d) 133
(1940) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Puckett, 216 Iowa 406, 249 N. W. 142 (1933).
116. First Trust Joint-Stock Land Bank v. Blount, 223 Iowa 1339, 275 N. W. 64
(1937).
117. State ex reL Coker v. District Court of Tulsa County, 159 Okla. 10, 11 P. (2d)
495 (1932); Ottman v. Tilbury, 204 Wis. 56, 234 N. AN. 325 (1931). See (1933) 33
COL L. Re, 1211. The problem frequently arises where tenants have purchased stock
in a cooperative apartment venture and hold possession under proprietary leases reserv-
ing a nominal monthly maintenance assessment. The income derived from these assess-
ments usually covers only operating costs, taxes and interest payments on the mortgage
debt, with no provision for amortization. A receiver appointed after default on the mort-
gage thus receives little or no proceeds to apply to the principal of the debt. See, for ex-
ample, Schaffer v. 8100 Jefferson Ave. East Corp., 267 Mich. 437, 255 N. W. 324 (1934).
118. Greenebaum Sons Bank & Trust Co. v. Kingsbury, 248 Ill. App. 321 (193);
Olive v. Levy, 201 App. Div. 262, 194 N. Y. Supp. 88 (2d Dep't 1922).
119. First Trust Joint-Stock Land Bank v. Cuthbert, 215 Iowa 718, 246 N. NV. 810
(1933); Kenney v. 149 N. Avenue Corp., 115 N. J. Eq. 314, 170 At. 822 (1933); Appli-
cation of Miller, 173 Misc. 347, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 59 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Prudence Co. v.
160 NV. Seventy-Third St. Corp., 260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932); Ottman v. Til-
bury, 204 Wis. 56, 234 N. WV. 325 (1931). Contra: Scott v. Hotchkiss, 115 Cal. S9, 47
Pac. 45 (1896); State ex rel. Coker v. District Court of Tulsa County, 159 Okla. 10,
11 P. (2d) 495 (1932).
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lusive schemes' 20 and has avoided setting up in the tenant a reciprocal
privilege of rejecting leases favorable to the mortgagee. 121
A closely allied problem is the right of a receiver to collect a "fair and
reasonable" rent from a mortgagor in actual possession. Where courts have
permitted receivers to demand rent from the mortgagor, the demand has
not imposed an absolute obligation to pay, but has given the mortgagor the
option of paying or vacating the premises. 122 A New York case has reversed
the previous practice in that state of permitting receivers generally to col-
lect rents from mortgagors in possession.123  In that case, however, the
court relied heavily upon the fact that there were no rents, as such, to be
collected and stressed the point that the receiver was appointed under a
receivership clause, and not under the general equity jurisdiction of the
court. While the fact that a receiver was appointed in the exercise of
equitable powers will not create rents, as such, the court may nevertheless
be willing in the future to distinguish the two on grounds that where the
value of the property itself is sufficient to cover the debt, there is no need
for compelling a mortgagor to supplement the security by rent payments,
whereas, if the pledge is inadequate, the mortgagor may justifiably be
required to furnish this additional security.
The mortgagee's quest for rents is further complicated where the same
property secures mortgages of differing priority. Since junior mortgages
convey merely the right to a lien upon the pledged asset, 124 a junior lienor
seeking to apply current rents to his debt must rely upon a rent receivership,
unless the mortgagor voluntarily relinquishes possession. Receivers are gen-
erally available to junior mortgagees, however, either by virtue of receiver-
ship clauses or by proof of inadequacy of the security 25 - which in their
120. See Comment, Remedies Against "Milking" of Property by Mortgagors (1933)
46 HARv. L. REv. 491; Note (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1211.
121. The ejectment rationale upon which the receiver's unrestricted, power to avoid
leases was predicated would seem to entail the reciprocal privilege in the lessee of elect-
ing between attornment to the receiver and vacation of the premises. Monro-King &
Gremmels Realty Corp. v. 9th Avenue-31 Street Corp., 233 App. Div. 401, 253 N. Y.
Supp. 303 (1st Dep't 1931); Evans v. Orgel, 221 Wis. 152, 266 N. W. 176 (1936). It
has been contended, however, that it is not necessary to bestow upon the tenant this
reciprocal privilege. See Tefft, Receivers and Leases Subordinate to the Mortgage (1934)
2 U. OF CHI. L. RFv. 33.
122. Since the mortgagor's obligation arises from a court order and not from a
lease, the proper remedy, where the mortgagor retains possession and fails to pay the
prescribed rental, is a contempt proceeding and not a summary proceeding. Title Guar-
antee & Trust Co. v. Feldon Realty Corp., 149 Misc. 206, 267 N. Y. Supp. 48 (Sup. Ct.
1933).
123. Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N. E. 285 (1933). See also 2 WILT-
SIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (5th ed. 1939) § 625; Abelow, The Doctrine of Holmes v.
Gravenhorst (1934) 3 BROOKLYx L. REV. 212.
124. Elmore v. Symonds, 183 Mass. 321, 67 N. E. 314 (1903).
125. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306, 189 N. E. 312 (1934); Zajic v. Sikora
Realty Corp., 252 App. Div. 343, 299 N. Y. Supp. 227 (2d Dep't 1937).
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case rarely presents a difficulty. The receiver does not act for lienors of
the property generally,'2 0 but impounds rents solely for the benefit of the
petitioning lienor,12 7 unless the court so frames the appointing order as to
require him to act for such other lienors,'2 8 or, upon application of another
lienor, extends the receivership to cover such other liens. 1 -2 Priority as to
rents thus depends, not upon the seniority of the mortgages, but upon the
sequence in which judicial aid is invoked. 1 0
A junior mortgagee's right to the rents collected by the receiver continues
until the senior mortgagee asserts his superior claim.312 This action by the
senior mortgagee may take various forms. While the commonest practice
is a petition for extension of the receivership, 32 courts have occasionally
granted petitions for a new receiver,133 or ordered possession to be sur-
rendered to the mortgagee. 3 4 Rents thereafter accruing, as well as uncol-
lected back rents, 35 are applied to the senior mortgagee's debt.
126. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306, 189 N. E. 312 (1934), 2 U. op C. L.
Rnv. 149.
127. I1; re New York State Railways, 16 F. Supp. 717 (N. D. N. Y. 1936).
128. Cross v. Will County National Bank, 177 Ill. 33, 52 N. E. 322 (1893); Fidelity
Mortgage Co. v. Mahon, 31 Ohio App. 151, 166 N. E. 207 (1929); see Note (1935)
95 A. L. R. 1051.
129. An interesting situation is created where the foreclosed mortgages are of equal
priority. In this situation, it has been held that had the other mortgagee joined the peti-
tioning mortgagee in bringing the foreclosure action, the receivership would have been
for their mutual benefit. But since the other mortgagee failed to join in the receivership,
the petitioning mortgagee was entitled to all funds collected by the receiver. Collins v.
Wallens, 143 Misc. 329, 256 N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
130. Motor Finance Co. v. Wenzlaff, 197 Iowa 314, 197 N. W. 60 (1924); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Fulton Development Corp., 265 N. Y. 348, 193 N. E. 169 (1934). See
also 2 WiVLTsiE, MORTGAGE FoRncLoSURE (5th ed. 1939) § 5S4; Note (1935) 95 A. L R.
1051. The distinction recognized in New Jersey between rent assignments and rent
pledges dictates different results. A senior mortgagee whose instrument contains a rent
assignment has a prior right to rents even though the junior mortgagee is in possession
or has procured the appointment of a receiver. Paramount Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Sacks, 107 N. J. Eq. 328, 152 Adt. 457 (1930). A senior mortgagee cannot long acquiesce
in the junior mortgagee's collection of rents, however, or the court will deem his acqui-
escence a waiver of his rights. Berman v. 145 Belmont Ave. Corp., 109 N. J. Eq. 256,
156 At. 830 (1931).
131. It re Kings County Real Estate Corp., 67 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
Norwood Savings Bank v. Romer, 43 Ohio App. 224, 183 N. E. 45 (1932); Wood v.
Fetzer, 19 S. NV (2d) 1113 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1929). But this rule does not apply
where the senior mortgagee has been led by acts or inducements of the junior mortgagee
to delay foreclosure or intervention. Monica Realty Corp. v. 122 Fifth Ave. Corp., 264
N. Y. 52, 189 N. E. 778 (1934).
132. Builders Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Wrobel, 266 Ill. App. 325 (1932); Putnam
v. Henderson, Hull & Co., 49 App. Div. 361, 63 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1st Dept 1900).
133. Bagdad Traders, Inc. v. Shanske, 137 Misc. 5, 244 N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
134. Volkenstein v. Slonim, 355 I1. 306, 189 N. E. 312 (1934).
135. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fulton Development Corp., 265 N. Y. 343, 193 N. E.
169 (1934).
1941] 1443
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A question which has occasioned considerable litigation is whether a
receiver owes to subsequently attaching lienors the duty to pay currently
accruing taxes and assessments.1 36 This liability, if permitted to accumulate,
substantially impairs the rents available to succeeding claimants. Although
appointing orders generally authorize receivers to pay these charges, 87
courts have interpreted such authorizations as permissive rather than man-
datory.1 3 8 judicial sanction of the non-payment by receivers of accruing
taxes is particularly detrimental to senior mortgagees, 130 since junior lienors
are thus enabled to undermine the senior mortgagees' contracted priority
even after their rights to rents have become vested.1
40
Controversy also arises regarding the disposition to be made of surplus
rents held by a senior mortgagee's receiver after satisfaction of the senior
mortgage. There are two theories upon which a junior mortgagee's claim
to this fund has been held to prevail against the mortgagor's residuary
interest. The first is that the receiver, although appointed for the benefit
of the senior mortgagee, holds rents in custodia legis for the benefit of all
interested parties in order of their rank.' 4 ' The second is that the rents thus
collected should be treated as if they constituted part of the surplus from
sale of the property. 42 While courts have not favored these characterizations
of the rent fund for other purposes, many have, expressly or by implica-
tion,' 43 accepted them in order to effectuate the junior lienor's claim.
144
The result seems justified, for by acknowledging his claim, the courts are,
in effect, merely recognizing his seniority over the unsecured creditors of
the mortgagor.
45
136. See Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 1352.
137. That a receiver incurs certain risks in paying taxes has been demonstrated in
Belcher v. Aaron, 8 Cal. (2d) 180, 64 P. (2d) 402 (1937). The court there held an
improperly appointed receiver liable to the mortgagor for the full value of the rents
collected, notwithstanding the fact that he had paid taxes out of the rents.
138. Bagdad Traders, Inc. v. Shanske, 137 Misc. 5, 244 N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
139. Junior lienors in possession are generally accountable to senior mortgagees, but
a senior mortgagee is not accountable to a junior mortgagee as such. Hannon v. Kitay
Realty Corp., 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 698 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
140. A bankruptcy trustee appointed under § 75 or § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,
however, is required by § 64(a) of the Act to pay accruing taxes. Central States Life
Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 98 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) ; Springfield v. Hotel Charles
Co., 84 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
141. Atlantic City National Bank v. Wilson, 108 N. J. Eq. 213, 154 Ati, 537 (1931).
142. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 Att. 254 (1932).
143. See, for example, Vogel v. Nachemson, 199 N. Y. 535, 92 N. E. 1105 (1910).
144. Copelin v. Calkins, 131 Ill. App. 149 (1907). Contra: Stamp v. Eckhardt, 204
Iowa 541, 215 N. W. 609 (1927).
145. New York courts have rejected both of these rationales as inconsistent with
their view that a receiver is a representative only of the person upon whose petition he
was appointed [Woman's Hospital of New York v. 67th St. Realty Co., 240 App, Div.
33, 268 N. Y. Supp. 725 (1st Dep't 1934)], but by a devious application of the doctrine
of marshalling assets they have granted the junior lienor indirectly what they feel they
cannot give him directly. See 2 WILTSIE, MORTGACE FOrECLOSURE (5th ed. 1939) § 631;
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The principal effect of the existence of junior lienors has been to precipitate
foreclosure. Upon default, their slender margin of security frequently leave--
them scant hope of realizing a full settlement of their debt. Hence junior
mortgagees are apt to bring a foreclosure action to secure whatever incre-
ment the rents may afford. The burden is thus imposed upon senior mort-
gagees to come forward to assert their rights, lest their security be drained
from under them. A few courts require junior mortgagees petitioning for
a receiver to bring into court all senior and junior mortgagees. 149 The
advantages of this practice are apparent. The senior mortgagee is saved
the necessity of maintaining a constant vigilance to protect his prior claim
to rents. And foreclosure may more readily be delayed until an improvement
in the land market, since a speculative claim to rents no longer will lure
junior lienors into precipitating a foreclosure. Furthermore, since all mort-
gagees may thus join in the receivership, ant , resulting surplus of rents may
automatically be distributed to successive lienors according to their priority.
THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY
Another factor which has considerably affected the mortgagee' claim to
rent during the past decade is the intervention of bankruptcy. While fore-
closures instituted prior to an adjudication of the mortgagor's bankruptcy
are not dissolved, 14T foreclosures thereafter may be brought only with the
consent of the bankruptcy court and under such conditions as it may im-
pose.148 Conflicts of jurisdiction are generally resolved by application of the
rule that the court first taking jurisdiction over the subject matter retains
control until it has exhausted its remedy.' 49 This rule enables a receiver
appointed by a state court prior to the mortgagor's bankruptcy to collect
rents for the mortgagee during the pendency of the foreclosure regardless
of the subsequent bankruptcy decree.150 Likewise, a mortgagee who has
already gained possession of the property is usually held not affected by a
subsequent bankruptcy. 15
Where bankruptcy has preceded default, a few courts have granted an
automatic accrual to the mortgagee's benefit of rents collected by the trustee
Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 1037. The senior mortgagee in satisfying his debt is compelled
to utilize all the rents before resorting to the proceeds of the property-thus effecting an
increase in the fund available to the junior lienor. If the senior mortgagee for any rea-
son fails to exhaust the rents, the junior lienor aill then be subrogated to his right to
the rents. Conroy v. Polstein, 150 App. Div. 832, 135 N. Y. Supp. 419 (2d Dep't 1912).
146. Bermes v. Kelley, 108 N. J. Eq. 289, 154 At. 860 (1931) ; cf. Mann v. Whitely,
36 N. M. 1, 6 P. (2d) 46S (1931).
147. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 19th & Walnut Streets Corp., 79 F. (2d) 284
(C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
148. Investors Syndicate v. Smith, 105 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
149. In re Standard Baths, 85 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
150. In re Barbizon Plaza, 3 F. Supp. 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); Fairchild v. Gray,
136 Misc. 704, 242 N. Y. Supp. 192 (County Ct. 1930).
151. Fox v. Detroit Trust Co., 285 Mich. 669, 281 N. W. 399 (1938) ; In re Burdich,
56 F. (2d) 288 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
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in bankruptcy, on the theory that the trustee represents both secured and
unsecured creditors ;152 but most courts have regarded rents collected prior
to a petition by the mortgagee as general assets distributable to unsecured
creditors. 15 3 Hence mortgagees must, as a rule, petition the bankruptcy
court for the relief desired. 6 4 In no case may a mortgagee be accorded
greater rights than he would have enjoyed had bankruptcy not intervened.15
While the mortgagee is usually entitled, under a rent clause, to a seques-
tration of rents as a matter of right, 15 6 leave to foreclose the mortgage or
surrender of possession to the mortgagee are matters of the bankruptcy
court's discretion. Although it is necessary for the bankruptcy court to
have power, in the interest of creditors generally, to prevent an inconsiderate
lienor from damaging the estate by instituting an untimely foreclosure,"6 7
it should exercise this power only when by postponement of the foreclosure
a higher price is reasonably to be anticipated. Refusal on any other grounds
to permit the mortgagee to foreclose would seem an unnecessary impair-
ment of the mortgagee's priority over unsecured claimants.
Bankruptcy courts are usually reluctant to surrender possession of the
mortgaged premises to the mortgagee. Justification for this policy lies in
the fact that retention of possession by the court will avoid complaints from
general creditors of mismanagement by the mortgagee, and at the same
time afford adequate protection to the mortgagee's right to rents.1 1 To
reserve its control over the pledged premises, the court frequently attaches,
as conditions to its consent to foreclosure, the provisos that a mortgagee
shall not seek possession or apply for a receiver. Such restrictions would
seem to fulfill the purposes of bankruptcy legislation without imposing any
undue burden upon the mortgagee.
CONCLUSION
Mortgagees faced with the dilemma of either liquidating their pledged
asset at prices far less than their secured debt,; or accepting in satisfaction
152. In re Wakey, 50 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
153. Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 98 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938);
In re Humeston, 83 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar
Holding Corp., 74 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Badaracco v. Gatti Paper Stock
Corp., 114 N. J. Eq. 551, 169 Atl. 281 (1933) (rent pledge). Contra: Associated Co.
v. Greenhut, 66 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) (rent assignment).
154. The petition may request: (1) permission to foreclose; (2) consent to the ap-
pointment of a rent receiver; (3) surrender of possession of the property to the mort-
gagee; or (4) a sequestration to the mortgagee's benefit of rents to be collected by the
trustee in bankruptcy. Wolf v. De Wolf & Co., Inc., 53 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 7th,
1931); Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston, 45 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
155. Investors Syndicate v. Smith, 105 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
156. Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 98 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
157. In re Morris White Holding Co., 52 F. (2d) 499 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
158. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934).
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of their debt property which they do not want,159 have relied increasingly
upon the rents of the pledged realty. But the reluctance of courts to grant
effect to rent clauses -evidenced in their resort to slippery legal concepts
and technical constructions of the mortgage language- has, in very many
instances, unduly hampered the mortgagee in effectuating his claim to rents
by extra-judicial means. This trend has been accompanied by a correspond-
ing leniency in the appointment of receivers.
The policy of requiring mortgagees to come into court to gain recognition
of their rights to rent can be rationalized in two ways. In the first place,
judicial reluctance to deprive the mortgagor of possession does not e.xtend
to the appointment of a receiver, since the receiver is regarded as an officer
of the court, whose duty it is to protect the rights of both parties in
interest. 60 Thus the mortgagor is safeguarded against the depredations
of plundering mortgagees, while the income is held in cuslodia legis for
application to possible deficiencies upon sale of the property. In the second
place, receiverships afford a method of compensating for any unreasonable
terms extracted by the mortgagee by reason of his superior bargaining power
at the time the mortgage was executed. Through the receivership device,
the procedure for realizing upon the mortgaged debt becomes formularized
under strict judicial surveillance, and less stress is placed upon the particular
terms of the mortgage. This also helps to protect the rights of an owner in
his mortgaged property.
But while receivership affords greater mutual protection, it exacts from
both parties a heavy price at a time when they can ill afford it.""1 A mort-
gagee in possession collects the rents and administers the property without
compensation, whereas a receiver deducts both his fee and administrative
expenses from the rents before applying them to the mortgaged debt. Liti-
gation expenses entailed in the procurement of the receiver increase the
burden. Considerations of economy, particularly relevant where insolvency
abounds, militate against this sweeping trend towards receiverships and
favor cheaper, extra-judicial forms of debt satisfaction more carefully adapted
to the particular case.162 Judicial encouragement of rent collection by the
mortgagee in possession, with the adequate means available in present-day
procedure for holding him to a reasonable standard of accountability, would
make available a device better suited to the needs of modern debt liquidation.
159. In taking over the secured asset, mortgagees must assume all liens existing on
that property. Lawn. View Building Corp. v. Weinstock, 288 I11. App. 320, 6 N. _. (2d)
276 (1937).
160. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 Ad. 254 (1932); Farmers' Saving
Bank of Shelby v. Pomeroy, 211 Iowia 337, 233 N. W. 483 (1930).
161. See Note (1934) 2 U. oF CHi. L. rzv. 149.
162. For example, in WVolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 II1. 306, 189 N. E. 312 (1934), one
of the factors upon which the court's decision turned, was the fact that the mortgagee in
possession could administer the property at 45 of the gross income, whereas a receiver-
ship would have cost 10% of the gross income.
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